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Upper Bounds via Lamination on the Constrained
Secrecy Capacity of Hypergraphical Sources
Chung Chan, Manuj Mukherjee, Navin Kashyap and Qiaoqiao Zhou
Abstract—Hypergraphical sources are a natural class of
sources for secret key generation, within which different subsets
of terminals sharing secrets are allowed to discuss publicly in
order to agree upon a global secret key. While their secrecy
capacity, i.e., the maximum rate of a secret key that can be
agreed upon by the entire set of terminals, is well-understood,
what remains open is the maximum rate of a secret key that
can be generated when there is a restriction on the overall rate
of public discussion allowed. In this work, we obtain a family
of explicitly computable upper bounds on the number of bits of
secret key that can be generated per bit of public discussion.
These upper bounds are derived using a lamination technique
based on the submodularity of the entropy function. In particular,
a specific instance of these upper bounds, called the edge-partition
bound, is shown to be tight for the pairwise independent network
model, a special case of the hypergraphical source. The secret key
generation scheme achieving this upper bound is the tree-packing
protocol of Nitinawarat et al., thereby resolving in the affirmative
the discussion rate optimality of the tree packing protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of secret key generation between a pair of
terminals was independently proposed by Maurer [2], and
Ahlswede and Csisza´r [3]. The pair of terminals are allowed
to interactively discuss in public over a noiseless broadcast
channel in order to agree upon a secret key, which is to
be secured from a passive eavesdropper who monitors the
communication sent over the public channel. The problem
was later extended to the case of multiple terminals observing
correlated sources by Csisza´r and Narayan [4]. The quantity of
interest in all of these works was the secrecy capacity, i.e., the
maximum rate of a secret key that can be agreed upon by all
the terminals. However, these works treated communication as
a free resource, an assumption which does not hold in practical
scenarios. In fact, Csisza´r and Narayan [4] showed using some
examples that their communication for omniscience strategy
used to achieve secrecy capacity may require strictly more
communication than needed.
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The first work to consider the effects of rate-limited com-
munication on the secret key generation problem is due to
Csisza´r and Narayan [5]. The authors derived a complete
characterization of the key-rate versus communication-rate
tradeoff for the two-terminal scenario where only one-way
discussion is allowed. Later, Tyagi [6] looked at the prob-
lem of characterizing the communication complexity, i.e., the
minimum rate of interactive communication needed to achieve
the secrecy capacity, for two-terminal sources. He obtained
a multi-letter expression for the communication complexity
using the interactive common information, a quantity related
to the Wyner common information [7], of the two sources.
Tyagi left open the question of characterizing the key-rate ver-
sus interactive communication-rate tradeoff for two-terminal
sources. This question was later partially addressed by Liu
et al. [8], who gave a complete characterization of the key-
rate versus communication-rate tradeoff for a fixed number of
communication rounds, using the ideas of interactive source
coding developed by Kaspi [9]. A complete and computable
characterization of the key-rate versus communication-rate
tradeoff for two-terminal sources with no restriction on the
number of communication rounds is still open. Liu et al. also
studied the quantity
CS(R)
R
, where CS(R) is the maximum rate
of secret-key with the rate of public discussion restricted to
R. Using the notion of a symmetric strong data processing
constant, the authors derived the behaviour of the ratio
CS(R)
R
in two regimes, when R goes to 0, and when CS(R) is close
to the secrecy capacity. While the above mentioned works all
involve sources with finite alphabets, the case with Gaussian
sources have also been considered. The characterization of the
key-rate versus communication-rate tradeoff for two-terminal
scalar and vector Gaussian sources has been carried out by
Watanabe and Oohama in [10] and [11].
While the problem for two-terminal sources has received a
fair bit of attention, literature on the multiterminal scenario
is scant. Attempts have been made to obtain bounds on
the communication complexity for multiterminal sources in
[12] and [13]. In [12], a lower bound on communication
complexity has been derived by extending Tyagi’s definition
of interactive common information to a multiterminal sce-
nario. Upper bounds on communication complexity have been
developed in [13] using the idea of decremental secret key
agreement [14]. Another direction of investigation has been
characterizing multiterminal sources, for which the commu-
nication for omniscience protocol of Csisza´r and Narayan is
communication-rate-optimal for achieving secrecy capacity. A
sufficient condition to check the optimality of the communi-
2cation for omniscience was derived in [15], and extensions of
this result to sources involving helpers, untrusted terminals,
and silent terminals was carried out in [16]. While the above
mentioned works look at the near secrecy capacity regime, the
zero communication-rate regime has been investigated in [17]
for the special case of finite linear sources.
In this paper, we study the key-rate versus communication-
rate tradeoff for multiterminal sources. At the outset we
must mention that a study of general multiterminal sources
is difficult, and hence, we shall restrict our attention to a
specific class of sources, namely, the hypergraphical source
[18]. To explain our choice, consider the following natural
scenario for secret key agreement. Certain subsets of terminals
already possess secrets shared locally among themselves, and
the terminals must agree upon a globally shared secret through
public discussion. Let us ask this simple question: How many
bits of globally shared secret can be generated using locally
shared secrets? The scenario described can be viewed as
a hypergraphical source. The hypergraphical source consists
of certain subsets of terminals observing i.i.d. sequences of
random variables, which can be thought of as the local
secrets. Therefore, the answer to the question posed earlier
is simply the secrecy capacity of the hypergraphical source.
Hypergraphical sources also appeared in the coded cooperative
data exchange (CCDE) problem [19], [20].
The main contribution of this work is obtaining upper
bounds on the ratio
CS(R)
R
for hypergraphical sources. Unlike
earlier works on the two-terminal scenario, our results are
not restricted to any particular regime and hold for every
possible communication rate R. The upper bounds on CS(R)
R
studied here are based on the fact that entropy is a submodular
set function [21]. Along with the specialized structure of the
hypergraphical source, the submodularity of entropy enables
us to define a ‘lamination’ procedure which serves as the key
ingredient to derive our bounds. The lamination procedure
we use essentially boils down to minimizing a weighted sum
of submodular functions using Edmonds’ Greedy Algorithm
[22, Theorem 44.3]. In particular, we obtain three different
upper bounds to
CS(R)
R
by laminating three different sums of
entropies. The first of these bounds, which we shall call the
edge-partition (EP) bound, gives us an exact characterization
of the key-rate versus communication-rate tradeoff for the so-
called pairwise independent network (PIN) model [23], [24],
which is a special case of the hypergraphical source. The
tightness of the EP bound for the PIN model is shown using
the tree-packing protocol of Nitinawarat and Narayan [24].
We would like to highlight that this is the first result which
completely characterizes the key-rate versus communication-
rate tradeoff for a large class of sources, without any restriction
on the number of rounds of interactive communication. Also,
the tradeoff does not involve any auxiliary random variables,
and in fact, it can be expressed simply in terms of the size
of the network. While the EP bound gives tight results for
the PIN model, we show using an example that it can be
loose for certain hypergraphical sources. To circumvent this
issue, we derive our second upper bound, which we call the
vertex-packing (VP) bound. Although, the VP bound is tight
for certain examples where the EP bound is loose, there are
examples where the VP bound is loose but the EP bound is
tight as well. To get the best of both the VP and EP bounds,
we generalize them to obtain a third bound which we simply
call the lamination bound.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces
the hypergraphical source and states the necessary definitions.
Section III describes the tree-packing protocol for the PIN
model. The main results of the paper, which include the EP
bound, the VP bound, and the lamination bound are presented
in Section IV. The contributions made by the paper, as well
as future directions of research are summarized in Section V.
The proofs of some of the technical results appear in the
appendices.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider the basic source model for multiterminal secret
key agreement in [4] but with no helpers and wiretapper’s side
information. It involves a finite set V of at least 2 users. With-
out loss of generality, we can set V to be [m] := {1, 2, . . . ,m}
with m ≥ 2. The users have access to a private (discrete
memoryless multiple) source, which is denoted by the random
vector
ZV := (Zi | i ∈ V ).
We assume that the random vector takes values from a finite
set denoted by
ZV :=
∏
i∈V
Zi.
Note that we use capital letters in sans serif font for random
variables and the corresponding capital letters in the usual
math italic font for the alphabet sets if there is no ambiguity.
PZV denotes the joint distribution of the Zi’s.
The users want to agree on a secret key via public dis-
cussion. As in [4], the protocol is divided into the following
phases:
Private observation: Each user i ∈ V observes an n-sequence
Z
n
i := (Zit | t ∈ [n]) = (Zi1,Zi2, . . . ,Zin)
i.i.d. generated from the source Zi for some block length n.
Private randomization: Each user i ∈ V generates a random
variable Ui independent of the private source, i.e.,
H(UV |ZV ) =
∑
i∈V
H(Ui). (2.1)
For convenience, we denote the entire private observation of
user i ∈ V as
Z˜i := (Ui,Z
n
i ). (2.2)
Public discussion: Using a public authenticated noiseless
channel, each user i ∈ V broadcasts a message Fit in round
t ∈ [ℓ] for some positive integer ℓ number of rounds. The
message is chosen as
Fit := fit(Z˜i, F˜it), (2.3a)
3which is a function of the accumulated observations of user i,
namely, his private observation Z˜i defined in (2.2), and the
previous discussion
F˜it := (F[i−1]t,F
t−1
V ), (2.3b)
where the first part F[i−1]t consists of the previous messages
broadcast in the same round, and the second part Ft−1V denotes
the messages broadcast in the previous rounds. Without loss
of generality, we have assumed that the interactive discussion
is conducted in the ascending order of user indices. For
convenience, we also write
Fi := Fi[ℓ] = (Fit | t ∈ [ℓ])
F := FV = (Fi | i ∈ V )
(2.3c)
(2.3d)
to denote, respectively, the aggregate message from user
i ∈ V and the aggregation of the messages from all users.
Key generation: A random variable K, called the secret key,
is required to satisfy the recoverability constraint that
lim
n→∞
Pr(∃i ∈ V,K 6= θi(Z˜i,F)) = 0, (2.4)
for some function θi, and the secrecy constraint that
lim
n→∞
1
n
[log|K| −H(K|F)] = 0, (2.5)
whereK denotes the finite alphabet set of possible key values.
It is desirable to have a large secret key rate 1
n
log|K|
but a small public discussion rate 1
n
log|F |. Our goal is to
characterize the optimal tradeoff between the secret key rate
and the total discussion rate:
Definition 2.1 The (total-discussion-rate-)constrained secrecy
capacity is defined for R ≥ 0 as
CS(R) := sup lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log|K| (2.6)
where the supremum is taken over all possible sequences of
(UV ,F,K) that satisfies the sum rate constraint on the public
discussion
R ≥ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log|F |, (2.7)
in addition to (2.4) and (2.5). ✷
The curve CS(R) for R ≥ 0 exists and is well-behaved with
the following basic properties.
Proposition 2.1 CS(R) is continuous, non-decreasing and
concave for R ≥ 0. ✷
PROOF Continuity is because the lim inf and lim sup in (2.7)
always exist, since CS(R) is bounded within [0, H(ZV )]. The
monotonicity is obvious, and concavity follows from the usual
time sharing argument. 
As motivated in the introduction, we will restrict to the
hypergraphical source model defined below:
Definition 2.2 (Definition 2.4 of [18]) ZV is a hypergraphi-
cal source with respect to a hypergraph (V,E, ξ) with edge set
E and edge function ξ : E → 2V \ {∅} iff, for some mutually
1
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Fig. 1: The hypergraph corresponding to the hypergraphical
source defined in (2.10). Each edge e corresponds to an
independent edge variable Xe in the private observation Zi
associated with each incident node (user) i.
independent (hyper)edge (random) variables Xe for e ∈ E, we
can write
Zi = (Xe | e ∈ E, i ∈ ξ(e)), for i ∈ V, (2.8)
The weight function c : 2V \ {∅} → R of a hypergraphical
source is defined as
c(B) :=
∑
e∈E:ξ(e)=B
H(Xe) with support
supp(c) :=
{
B ∈ 2V \ {∅} | c(B) > 0
}
(2.9a)
(2.9b)
For convenience, we further make some mild assumptions
on the hypergraphical sources we will consider:
1) Every edge variable is non-trivial, i.e., H(Xe) > 0 for all
e ∈ E.
2) There exists at least one edge variable, i.e., |E| > 0.
3) No edge covers the entire set, i.e., ξ(e) ( V for all e ∈ E.
The first assumption is without loss of generality, the second is
to avoid triviality. The last assumption is for simplicity.1 Note
also that the two-user case is also trivial, with CS(R) = 0,
and so we focus on the case |V | > 2.
An example of a hypergraphical source is as follows.
Example 2.1 Let Xa,Xb,Xc and Xd be four uniformly ran-
dom and independent bits. With V = [5], define
Z1 := (Xa,Xb, Xc,Xd )
Z2 := (Xa, Xc )
Z3 := (Xa, Xb )
Z4 := ( Xb, Xc )
Z5 := ( Xd ).
(2.10)
This is a hypergraphical source, illustrated in Fig. 1 with edge
set E = {a, b, c, d}, and edge function
ξ(a) = {1, 2, 3}, ξ(b) = {1, 3, 4},
ξ(c) = {1, 2, 4}, and ξ(d) = {1, 5}.
The weight function c has c(B) = 1 for B equal to any of the
subsets above, which form the support of c, i.e., supp(c) =
{{1, 2, 3}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 4}, {1, 5}}. ✷
1It is possible to extend the results of this work to allow for edges covering
the entire set: The corresponding edge variables can be used directly as the
secret key after simple source compression, without any additional public
discussion.
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Fig. 2: The graphical representation of the PIN in (2.11).
A simpler source model we shall also consider is the
special hypergraphical source model when the hypergraph
corresponds to a graph:
Definition 2.3 ([23, 24]) ZV is a pairwise independent net-
work (PIN) iff it is hypergraphical with edge function satisfy-
ing |ξ(e)| = 2 for all e ∈ E. ✷
Example 2.2 With V = [3], define
Z1 := Xa
Z2 := (Xa,Xb,Xc)
Z3 := ( Xb,Xc).
(2.11)
where Xa,Xb,Xc are independent uniformly random bits. The
private source (Z1,Z2,Z3) is a PIN illustrated in Fig. 2 with
edge set E = {a, b, c}, edge function ξ satisfying
ξ(a) = {1, 2}, ξ(b) = ξ(c) = {2, 3},
and weight function
c({1, 2}) = H(Xa) = 1, c({2, 3}) = H(Xb) +H(Xc) = 2,
and 0 otherwise. Hence, the support of c is supp(c) =
{{1, 2}, {2, 3}}. ✷
III. PRELIMINARIES
If there is no limit on the public discussion rate, the secrecy
capacity, referred to as the unconstrained secrecy capacity, is
defined and characterized in [4] as
CS(∞) := lim
R→∞
CS(R)
= CS(RCO) = H(ZV )−RCO
(3.1)
(3.2)
where RCO is the smallest rate of communication for omni-
science, characterized in [4] by the linear program
RCO = min
rV ∈RV
r(V ) such that
r(B) ≥ H(ZB|ZV \B) ∀B ( V,
(3.3a)
(3.3b)
where we have used for notational convenience that
r(B) :=
∑
i∈B
ri.
The inequalities in (3.3b) consist of the usual Slepian-
Wolf constraints for source networks. The capacity-achieving
scheme in [4] requires all users to recover the entire source
ZV (i.e., attain omniscience) by public discussion at the
smallest total rate RCO, and then extract the secret key from
their recovered source at rate H(ZV )−RCO. Despite having
exponentially many constraints, the linear program (3.3) can be
computed in (strongly) polynomial-time [25, 26], and hence,
so can CS(∞).
However, it was also mentioned in [4] that the unconstrained
capacity can be attained by a possibly smaller discussion rate,
referred later in [12] as the communication complexity
RS = min{R ≥ 0 | CS(R) = CS(∞)} ≤ RCO. (3.4)
For the PIN model, in particular, there is a protocol in [23,
Proof of Theorem 3.3] that achieves the unconstrained secrecy
capacity [23, (15),(17)] possibly with smaller discussion rate.
Proposition 3.1 ([23, 24]) For a PIN,
CS(R) ≥
∑
j∈[k]
ηj ∀R ≥ (|V | − 2)
∑
j∈[k]
ηj (3.5a)
where k is a non-negative integer; ηj ∈ R+ is a non-negative
real number; Tj := (V, Ej) is a spanning tree with edge set
Ej ⊆ {B ∈ supp(c) | |B| = 2} satisfying∑
j∈[k]:B∈Ej
ηj ≤ c(B) ∀B ∈
(
V
2
)
(3.5b)
Furthermore, the lower bound in (3.5a) achieves the uncon-
strained secrecy capacity. ✷
Note that the feasible solutions {(ηj , Tj) | j ∈ [k]} to
the lower bound in (3.5a) are called fractional tree pack-
ings because the constraint (3.5b) requires the total weights∑
j∈[k]:B∈Ej
ηj of all the trees covering each set B to not
exceed the weight c(B). The achieving scheme is therefore
called the tree-packing protocol. The unconstrained secrecy
capacity is the fractional tree packing number.
It was left as an open problem in [24] whether the tree-
packing protocol achieves the communication complexity RS.
One may further ask whether the scheme achieves the con-
strained secrecy capacity CS(R) for all R ≥ 0. We resolve
this in the affirmative in Theorem 4.2 by providing a matching
converse. This idea can be motivated more concretely with the
following example.
Example 3.1 Consider the PIN model defined in (2.11). If
user 2 reveals F := Xa ⊕ Xb in public so that everyone can
observe it, then user 3 can recover Xa as F⊕ Xb. K := Xa is
a secret key bit generated by the public discussion F because
not only is K recoverable by all users, with the recoverability
constraint (2.4) being satisfied, but it is also uniformly random
and independent of the public discussion F, thus satisfying the
secrecy constraint (2.5).
The above secret key agreement scheme is indeed a tree
packing protocol. There is only one possible spanning tree,
namely T1 = (V, E1) with E1 = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}. To satisfy
the weight constraint (3.5b), we can set η1 ≤ 1 = c({1, 2}) ≤
c({2, 3}). Hence, it follows from (3.5a) that, for η1 ∈ [0, 1],
CS(R) ≥ η1 ∀R ≥ η1,
or equivalently
CS(R) ≥ min{R, 1}. (3.6)
It is easy to see that the capacity cannot exceed 1 bit since user
1 observes at most 1 bit in private, and 1 bit of secret key is
achievable by the above discussion scheme. The smallest rate
of communication for omniscience is RCO = 2 because there
5are H(ZV ) = 3 bits of randomness in the source but user 1
only gets to observe 1 bit in private. It can be checked that
the formula (3.2) relating CS(∞) and RCO holds, and that
the linear program (3.3) for RCO is solved by the rate tuple
(r1, r2, r3) = (0, 1+ǫ, 1−ǫ) for any ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. The bound (3.4)
on communication complexity is RS ≤ RCO = 2. However,
this bound is loose because the earlier capacity-achieving
discussion F is only 1 bit, i.e., we have RS ≤ 1 < RCO. It
can be shown that the best existing lower bound from [12, 15]
is RS ≥ 0, which is trivial. Hence, the existing result are not
sufficient to characterize RS, let alone the constrained secrecy
capacity CS(R).
It turns out that the lower bound (3.6) on CS(R) for the
current example is tight, which implies RS = 1. Proving the
reverse inequality is non-trivial and is the motivation of the
techniques introduced in this work. ✷
IV. MAIN RESULTS
Unless otherwise stated, all the results apply to the hyper-
graphical source model in Definition 2.2 with the additional
assumptions stated after that. We will also consider the non-
trivial case involving |V | > 2 users. For ease of understanding,
we will present the most general result towards the end of this
section, after introducing some of its simpler variants which
already give tight characterizations of the capacities for simple
hypergraphical sources.
A. Edge-partition bound
Let Π′(V ) be the collection of partitions of V into at least
two non-empty disjoint sets.
Theorem 4.1 (EP bound) For any partition P ∈ Π′(V ), an
upper bound on the constrained secrecy capacity (2.6) is given
by
[1− α(P)]CS(R) ≤ α(P)R, where
α(P) :=
maxe∈E |{C ∈ P | ξ(e) ∩ C 6= ∅}| − 1
|P| − 1
.
(4.1a)
(4.1b)
This is called the edge-partition (EP) bound.
PROOF See Appendix A 
Note that we did not incorporate the obvious upper bound
CS(R) ≤ CS(∞) into (4.1) to avoid distraction. This obvious
upper bound will also be implicit in the subsequent results. The
name “edge-partition bound” is because the critical component
α(P) of the bound is obtained by partitioning the edges of
the hypergraph. More precisely, in the numerator of α(P) in
(4.1b), the expression {C ∈ P | ξ(e)∩C 6= ∅} is the collection
of subsets in the partition P that intersects the incident nodes
ξ(e) of an edge e. The size of this collection minus 1 is the
number of times P cuts across the edge e. Therefore, the
numerator of α(P) is the maximum number of times P can cut
across an edge of the hypergraphical source. The denominator
is the number of cuts across the entire vertex set V . Hence,
α(P) is a ratio no larger than 1, with equality if there is an
edge e that covers the entire vertex set, i.e., ξ(e) = V .
An example that illustrates the EP bound is as follows.
Example 4.1 Consider the hypergraphical source defined in
(2.10). (See Fig. 1.) We will compute the tightest EP bound
among all possible values of the partition P ∈ Π′(V ).
Consider the case |P| = 5, namely, the singleton partition
P = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}}. The following matrix lists the
non-zero values of the indicator function χ{ξ(e)∩C 6= ∅} for
different edges e ∈ E and blocks C ∈ P of the partition.
a b c d
{1} 1 1 1 1
{2} 1 1
{3} 1 1
{4} 1 1
{5} 1
sum 3 3 3 2
The last row gives the column sums, which corresponds to the
values of |{C ∈ P | ξ(e) ∩ C 6= ∅}|. The maximum value is
3, and so
α(P) =
3− 1
5− 1
=
1
2
∀P ∈ Π′(V ) : |P| = 5.
For P ∈ Π′(V ) with |P| = 4, there are
(
4
2
)
= 6 possible
partitions. The values of α(P) can be computed similarly. It
can be checked that maxe∈E |{C ∈ P | ξ(e) ∩ C 6= ∅}| ≥ 3
and so
α(P) ≥
3− 1
4− 1
=
2
3
∀P ∈ Π′(V ) : |P| = 4.
This gives a looser EP bound compared to the previous case
with |P| = 5 as it can be observed from the EP bound (4.1)
that a smaller value of α(P) gives a tighter bound.
Similarly, for P ∈ Π′(V ) with |P| ≤ 3, it can be shown that
|{C ∈ P | ξ(e)∩C 6= ∅}| ≥ 2 and so α(P) ≥ 12 , which again
cannot give a better EP bound than the case with |P| = 5.
Hence, with α(P) = 12 , we have the tightest EP bound(
1−
1
2
)
CS(R) ≤
1
2
R
which gives CS(R) ≤ R. ✷
Although the EP bound can be computed efficiently given
a particular choice of the partition P , it is unclear how to
efficiently compute the optimal partition P that gives the
tightest EP bound. As we shall see in next section, the EP
bound is also loose for the above example.
Nevertheless, when restricted to the PIN model in Defini-
tion 2.3, the optimal partition turns out to be the partition
{{i} | i ∈ V } into singletons. The tightest EP bound
gives a complete and surprisingly simple characterization of
the constrained secrecy capacity, which is also achieved by
the tree-packing protocol described in Proposition 3.1 and
illustrated in Example 3.1.
Theorem 4.2 For the PIN model, the constrained secrecy
capacity is
CS(R) = min
{
R
|V | − 2
, CS(∞)
}
(4.2)
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Fig. 3: The triangle PIN defined in (4.3).
for the case of interest when |V | ≥ 3. It follows that the
communication complexity defined in (3.4) is RS = (|V | −
2)CS(∞). ✷
Remark 4.1 The optimal tradeoff is irrelevant to the topology
of the PIN model, and is characterized simply by the size of
the network. ✷
PROOF Note that the lower bound ≥ of (4.2) directly follows
from (3.5a) in Proposition 3.1. Furthermore, CS(∞) equals
the fractional tree-packing number.
The converse follows from (4.1) with P = {{i} | i ∈ V }.
More precisely, the maximization in the numerator of α(P) is
always equal to 2 as it is the number of incident nodes of an
edge. Hence, α(P) = 1|V |−1 , and so, the EP bound gives
(|V | − 2)CS(R) ≤ R,
which completes the proof of (4.2). The formula for RS is
obtained easily by equating the two terms in the minimization
in (4.2). 
For the PIN defined in (2.11), for instance, the bound (3.6)
of CS(R) is the precise characterization given by the above
equation (4.2). As discussed, the tradeoff is irrelevant to the
topology. To illustrate, another 3-user example is as follows.
Example 4.2 Consider a triangle PIN with V = [3] and
Z1 := (Xa, Xc)
Z2 := (Xa,Xb )
Z3 := ( Xb,Xc)
(4.3)
where Xa,Xb,Xc are independent uniformly random bits. This
is a PIN with correlation represented by a triangle as shown
in Fig. 3. It follows from (3.1), (3.3) and (3.4) that
CS(∞) = RCO = 1.5 ≥ RS.
The capacity 1.5 is achievable by the tree-packing protocol
with the following fractional solution
E1 = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}} η1 =
1
2
E2 = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}} η2 =
1
2
E3 = {{2, 3}, {1, 3}} η3 =
1
2 .
Applying (4.2), we have
CS(R) = min{R, 1.5} and RS = 1.5 = RCO.
The tradeoff is the same as the PIN defined in (2.11). Note
that unlike Example 3.1, the characterization of RS for this
example can be obtained using an existing technique in [15]
by showing the optimality of omniscience. ✷
B. Vertex-packing bound
Although the EP bound is tight for the PIN model, with
P = {{i} | i ∈ V }, it can be loose in general. In particular, the
following result will give a tighter upper bound on CS(R) for
the hypergraphical source considered earlier in Example 4.1.
Theorem 4.3 (VP bound) For any R ≥ 0,
(τ − 1)CS(R) ≤ R, where
τ := max
uV ∈RV+ :u(ξ(e))≤1,∀e∈E
u(V ).
(4.4a)
(4.4b)
This is called the vertex-packing (VP) bound.
PROOF See Appendix B. 
Note that the name of the bound comes from the fact that
the feasible solution uV to the above linear program (4.4b) is
a fractional collection of the vertices that can be packed into
the hyperedges. We will show below that the VP bound can
be tighter than the tightest EP bound CS(R) ≤ R obtained in
Example 4.1. Note also that the VP bound can be computed
more efficiently than the tightest EP bound.
Example 4.3 Consider the previous hypergraphical source
defined in (2.10). The constraints of (4.4b) are
u1 +u2 +u3 ≤ 1
u1 +u3 +u4 ≤ 1
u1 +u2 +u4 ≤ 1
u1 +u5 ≤ 1
The optimal solution to (4.4b) is given uniquely by

u1
u2
u3
u4
u5

 =


0
1
2
1
2
1
2
1

 , which achieves τ =
5∑
i=1
ui =
5
2
.
Hence, by (4.4),
(
5
2 − 1
)
CS(R) ≤ R, or equivalently,
CS(R) ≤
2
3R. This bound is not only tighter than the tightest
EP bound CS(R) ≤ R, but it can also be shown to be
achievable, i.e., it can be shown that CS(R) =
2
3R up to
the unconstrained capacity CS(∞) = 1. Consider two inde-
pendent realizations of the source, i.e., let Xat,Xbt,Xct,Xdt
be the independent bits at time t ∈ {1, 2}. User 1 reveals
F1 = (Xa1 ⊕ Xd1,Xc1 ⊕ Xd2,Xa1 ⊕ Xb1 ⊕ Xd2) in public.
Then, the users can agree on 2 bits of secret key, namely
K = (Xd1,Xd2), which are independent of the discussion.
Since 2 bits of secret key can be agreed by 3 bits of discussion
for every 2 units of time, we have CS(
3
2 ) ≥
2
2 = 1. By
the usual time-sharing argument, CS(R) ≥ min{
2
3R, 1} as
desired. Therefore, the VP bound is tight for this example. ✷
Note that the VP bound is not always better than the EP
bound, i.e., it is possible for the EP bound to be strictly tighter
than the VP bound, as the following example shows.
Example 4.4 Consider the PIN model on a complete graph,
i.e., with E =
(
V
2
)
. (See the triangle PIN in Example 4.2 for
|V | = 3.) Note that
τ = max
uV ∈RV+ :ui+uj≤1,∀i,j∈V
u(V ) =
|V |
2
.
7Then, by (4.4), the VP bound is[
|V |
2
− 1
]
CS(R) ≤ R
which is worse than the EP bound [|V | − 2]CS(R) = R in
the non-trivial case |V | > 2. ✷
C. Lamination Bound
It is possible that both the EP and VP bounds are loose.
Indeed, the bounds can be unified and improved to a more
general bound, called lamination bound below:
Theorem 4.4 (Lamination Bound) For all R ≥ 0,
β(π)CS(R) ≤ [γ(λ, π, ρ)− β(π)]R (4.5a)
where
β(π) := min
e∈E
∑
B∈2V \{∅,V }:ξ(e)⊆B
π(B)
γ(λ, π, ρ) := ρ+
∑
B∈2V \{∅,V }
[π(B)− ρλ(B)] .
(4.5b)
(4.5c)
The parameter ρ ≥ 0 and set functions λ, π : 2V → R+ are
chosen such that∑
B⊆2V \{∅,V }:i∈B
λ(B) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ V
π(B) − ρλ(B) ≥ 0 ∀B ∈ 2V \ {∅, V }.
(4.6a)
(4.6b)
and so λ is a fractional packing of V according to (4.6a). ✷
PROOF See Appendix C. 
Corollary 4.1 The lamination bound (4.5) covers the EP
bound (4.1) and VP bound (4.4) as special cases. ✷
PROOF See Appendix D. 
The following example illustrates the above lamination
bound and shows that it can be strictly better than the EP
and VP bounds.
Example 4.5 Consider the following hypergraphical source,
illustrated in Fig. 4:
Z1 := (Xa,Xb, Xc )
Z2 := (Xa, Xc,Xd )
Z3 := (Xa, Xb )
Z4 := ( Xb, Xc )
Z5 := ( Xd )
(4.7)
Compared to the source defined in (2.10) and illustrated in
Fig. 1, the difference is that the edge d connects node 5 to
node 2 instead of node 1.
We can calculate the tightest EP bound as in Example 4.1:
• For |P| = 5, α(P) = 3−15−1 =
1
2 ;
• For |P| = 4, α(P) ≥ 3−14−1 =
2
3 ;
• For |P| = 3, α(P) ≥ 2−13−1 =
1
2 ;
• For |P| = 2, α(P) ≥ 2−12−1 = 1.
Therefore, the tightest EP bound (4.1) is CS(R) ≤ R, which
was given by the smallest α(P) = 12 .
1
23
4 5
a
b
c
d
Fig. 4: The hypergraphical source defined in (4.7).
For the VP bound, the constraints of (4.4b) are
u1 +u2 +u3 ≤ 1
u1 +u3 +u4 ≤ 1
u1 +u2 +u4 ≤ 1
u2 +u5≤ 1
It can be show that τ =
∑5
i=1 ui = 2, with u1 = u5 = 1
and u2 = u3 = u4 = 0. Therefore, the VP bound (4.4) is
CS(R) ≤ R.
Computing the tightest lamination bound is not easy due to
its generality. For this example, however, the lamination bound
turns out to be achievable (and therefore tight) for following
choice of parameters:
ρ =
20
3
λ(B) =


0.6, B ∈ {{1, 3, 4}, {2, 5}}
0.15, B ∈ {{1, 2, 3, 5}, {1, 2, 4, 5}}
0.1, B = {1, 2, 3, 4}
0, otherwise.
π(B) =


4, B ∈ {{1, 3, 4}, {2, 5}, {1, 2, 3, 5}, {1, 2, 4, 5}}
8, B = {1, 2, 3, 4}
0, otherwise.
It is straight-forward to check that ρ, λ and π satisfy the
constraints (4.6). By (4.5b) and (4.5c), we have β(π) =
12, γ(λ, π, ρ) = 20. The lamination bound (4.5a) is CS(R) ≤
2
3R, which is strictly better than the EP and VP bounds.
To show that the bound is tight up to the unconstrained se-
crecy capacity, consider n = 2 independent realizations of the
private source, i.e., let Xat,Xbt,Xct,Xdt be the independent
bits at time t ∈ {1, 2}. If user 1 and user 2 reveal in public
F1 = Xa1 ⊕ Xb1 ⊕ Xc1 and F2 = (Xa1 ⊕ Xd2,Xc1 ⊕ Xd1),
respectively, then all users can recover Xa1,Xb1,Xc1,Xd1,Xd2
perfectly. Let K = (Xd1,Xd2) be the secret key, which is inde-
pendent of the discussion (F1,F2). Since the users can agree
on 2 bits of secret key by 3 bits of discussion in 2 time units,
the constrained secrecy capacity is CS(R) ≥ min{
2
3R, 1}. ✷
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we give explicit upper bounds on the maximum
secret key rate achievable by any given total public discussion
rate. The focus is on the multiterminal setting, where we spe-
cialize to the hypergraphical source model to circumvent the
difficulties of the 2-user case. We exploited the independence
of the edge variables to derive the bounds using the lamination
8procedure from Edmonds’ greedy algorithm in submodular
function optimization. The bounds include
• the EP bound (4.1), which is shown to be tight for the
PIN model and therefore gives a surprising simple char-
acterization of the capacity achievable by tree packing;
• the VP bound (4.4), which can sometimes give a tighter
bound than the EP bound as illustrated by Example 4.3;
and
• the lamination bound (4.5), which generalizes and strictly
improves both the EP and VP bounds as shown by
Example 4.5.
These bounds do not involve any auxiliary random variables,
making them easier to compute than the usual single-letter
solutions. Furthermore, the strongest lamination bound appears
to be tight for all the examples we have constructed.
Nevertheless, we suspect that the lamination bound may
be further improved. An alternative proof of upper bound
for Example 4.5 is given in Appendix E. The alternative
proof appears to be more elegant, as it applies the lamination
procedure two times in a row to give the desired bound
CS(R) ≤
2
3R more naturally. However, it is unclear how to
give an analytical form to the bound obtained from iterative
lamination. We also do not yet have an example to show that
iterative lamination gives a strictly tighter bound.
As in [16], there are new challenges when extending the
results to a more general setting involving trusted/untrusted
helpers [4] and silent active users [27]. Even for the sim-
ple PIN model with some trusted helpers, the tree-packing
protocol extended using Steiner trees is not optimal because
it may not attain the unconstrained capacity [24]. There is
a more general network coding approach in [25, 28] for
secret key agreement, and we have used such an approach
in constructing the optimal secret key agreement schemes for
the hypergraphical sources in Example 4.3 and 4.5. We believe
this approach is optimal for general hypergraphical sources,
but a rigorous proof remains elusive even for the basic case
without helpers.
Another interesting question is to efficiently generate inde-
pendent groupwise secret keys instead of a global secret key.
Note that the groupwise secret keys form a hypergraphical
source, with each group represented by an edge with weight
equal to the total secret key rate of that group. Essentially,
the question of interest is whether one can convert from one
hypergraph (the original source) to another (the groupwise
secret keys), and if so, how much effort (discussion rate)
is required. It can be shown that public discussion is an
irreversible process, in a way, like the second law of ther-
modymics. It therefore defines a partial ordering of weighted
hypergraphs, with the PIN models at one end and the trivial
hypergraphs with edges covering all vertices in the other end.
This combinatorial structure may be interesting and useful in
its own right.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF EP BOUND IN THEOREM 4.1
To prove Theorem 4.1, we will make use of Edmonds’
greedy algorithm in combinatorial optimization [22, Theo-
rem 44.3]. A set function f : 2S → R with a finite ground set
S is said to be submodular iff for all B1, B2 ⊆ S,
f(B1) + f(B2) ≥ f(B1 ∩B2) + f(B1 ∪B2). (A.1)
f is said to be supermodular if −f is submodular. If f is both
submodular and supermodular, it is said to be modular. f is
said to be normalized if f(∅) = 0. The entropy function B →
H(ZB), for instance, is a well-known normalized submodular
function [21, 29]. Edmonds’ greedy algorithm states that:
Proposition A.1 ([22, Theorem 44.3]) For any normalized
submodular function f : 2S → R with a finite ground set
S, and any non-negative weight vector wS := (ws | s ∈ S) ∈
RS+, consider the linear program
min
µ
∑
B⊆S
µ(B)f(B) (A.2a)
such that µ : 2S → R+ is a non-negative set function
satisfying ∑
B⊆S : s∈B
µ(B) = ws, ∀s ∈ S. (A.2b)
Then, the optimal solution µ∗ to the above problem is given
as follows:
1) Enumerate S as {s1, ..., sk} (with k := |S|) such that
ws1 ≥ · · · ≥ wsk .
2) With Sj := {sj′ | 1 ≤ j′ ≤ j} for 1 ≤ j ≤ k, set
µ∗(Sj) := wsj − wsj+1 for 1 ≤ j < k
µ∗(Sk) = µ
∗(S) := wsk
(A.3a)
(A.3b)
and µ∗(B) = 0 otherwise, i.e., if B 6= Sj for 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
It follows that, if f is modular, the summation in (A.2a) is
constant for all feasible µ satisfying (A.2b).2 ✷
The algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 5a, which is a plot of ws
against s ∈ S. In particular, the horizontal axis enumerates
the elements S in a descending order of their weights w as
desired by the greedy algorithm in Step 1. The set of first j
elements form the set Sj , and the µ
∗(Sj) is the drop in height
from the j-th bar to the (j+1)-th bar, with the exception that
µ∗(Sk) (or equivalently µ
∗(S)) is the height of the last bar.
The proof is by a lamination procedure that can turn any
µ to µ∗ gradually without increasing the sum in (A.2a) or
violating (A.2b):
Lamination: For every B1, B2 ∈ supp(µ) such that B1 crosses
B2 in the sense that
{B1, B2} 6= {B1 ∩B2, B1 ∪B2},
reduce µ(B1) and µ(B2) by δ and increase µ(B1 ∩ B2) and
µ(B1 ∪B2) by δ, where
δ := min{µ(B1), µ(B2)} ≥ 0,
2This is because −f is submodular and so the same µ∗ defined in (A.3)
both minimizes and maximizes the sum in (A.2a), the value of which must
therefore be a constant.
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s1
wsj
sj
wsj+1
sj+1
wsk
sk
Sj := {sj′ | j
′ ≤ j}
Sk = S
µ∗(Sj) := wsj − wsj+1
µ∗(S) := wsk
s ∈ S
ws
(a) µ∗ in general (A.3).
w0 = |P|
s
1
=
0
we1
s
2
=
e
1
wej
s
j
+
1=
e
j
wej+1
s
j
+
2=
e
j
+
1
we|E|
s
|E
|+
1
=
e
|E
|
s
|E
|+
2
1
s
|E
|+
|V
|+
1
S1 = {0}
Sj+1 = {0} ∪ {ej′ | j
′ ≤ j}
S|E|+1 = {0} ∪ E
S|V |+|E|+1 = S
V
µ∗(S1) = |P| − we1
µ∗(Sj+1) = wej − wej+1
µ∗(S|E|+1) = we|E| − 1
µ∗(S) = 1
s ∈ S
ws
(b) µ∗ applied to the proof of (A.11).
Fig. 5: Illustration of Edmonds’ greedy algorithm in Lemma A.1.
where the non-negativity is by the assumption that µ is non-
negative. Doing so reduces
∑
B⊆S µ(B)f(B) by
δ[f(B1) + f(B2)− f(B1 ∩B2)− f(B1 ∪B2)] ≥ 0,
where the non-negativity is by the submodularity (A.1) of f .
The procedure turns the support of µ to that of µ∗, namely
{Sj | 1 ≤ j ≤ k}, which forms a laminar family (or more
specifically, a chain).
Proposition A.1 implies an interesting inequality below,
which will be frequently used later.
Corollary A.1 Consider a finite set N with 0 /∈ N without
lose of generality, and a random vector YN := (Yi | i ∈
N) where Yi’s are mutually independent. Let Y0 be another
random variable which need not be independent of YN . For
any non-negative set function µ : 2N → R+, we have∑
B⊆N
µ(B)H(Y0|YB) ≥
∑
B⊆S
µ∗(B)H(Y0|YB\{0}) (A.4)
where S = {0} ∪N and µ∗(B) is obtained by laminating µ
as in (A.3). ✷
PROOF Note that H(Y0|YB) = H(Y0,YB) − H(YB). Let
S = {0}∪N and f(B) := H(YB) for B ⊆ S. It follows that
f is normalized and submodular as it is an entropy function
of YS [21]. Then,∑
B⊆N
µ(B)H(Y0|YB)
=
∑
B⊆N
µ(B)H(Y0,YB)−
∑
B⊆N
µ(B)H(YB)
≥
∑
B⊆S
µ∗(B)H(Y0,YB)−
∑
B⊆N
µ(B)H(YB)
=
∑
B⊆S
µ∗(B)H(Y0,YB)−
∑
B⊆S
µ∗(B)H(YB\{0}),
where the first inequality follows from Proposition A.1; the last
equality also follows from Proposition A.1 since the function
f(B) := H(YB) for B ⊆ N is modular, by the assumption
that Yi’s among N are mutually independent. This completes
the proof. 
PROOF (THEOREM 4.1) For any P ∈ Π′(V ), by (2.4) and
Fano’s inequality,
nδn ≥
∑
C∈P
H(K|F, Z˜C)
=
∑
C∈P
H(K,F|Z˜C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1,
−
∑
C∈P
H(F|Z˜C)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2,
(A.5)
for some δn → 0 as n→∞, where the last equality is by the
chain rule expansion. We will bound 1, and 2, to obtain the
desired lower bound (4.1).
2, can be bounded by the usual technique (cf. [30,
Lemma B.1]):
2,
(a)
=
∑
C∈P
ℓ∑
t=1
∑
i∈V
H(Fit|F˜it, Z˜C)
(b)
≤
∑
C∈P
ℓ∑
t=1
∑
i∈V \C
H(Fit|F˜it)
(c)
=
ℓ∑
t=1
∑
i∈V
∑
C∈P : i6∈C
H(Fit|F˜it)
(d)
=(|P| − 1)
ℓ∑
t=1
∑
i∈V
H(Fit|F˜it)
(e)
=(|P| − 1)H(F) (A.6)
• where (a) follows from the chain rule expansion on
F (2.3);
• (b) is because
H(Fit|F˜it, Z˜C)
{
= 0 if i ∈ C by (2.3a),
≤ H(Fit|F˜it) otherwise;
• (c) is obtained by interchanging sums;
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• (d) is because the summand on r.h.s. of (c) is constant
with respect to C, and so the inner summation gives a
multiplicative factor of |P| − 1.
• (e) follows again from the chain rule expansion on
F (2.3).
Next, we will bound 1, using (A.4) in Corollary A.1. For
notational simplicity, define
Ei := {e | i ∈ ξ(e)} for i ∈ V
EC :=
⋃
i∈C
Ei for C ⊆ V,
which denote the collection of edges incident on node i ∈
V and nodes in C ⊆ V respectively. Let N = V ∪ E and
S = {0} ∪ N , where we assume 0 6∈ V ∪ E without loss of
generality. Define YS with
Y0 = (F,K)
Yi = Ui for i ∈ V
Ye = X
n
e for e ∈ E.
(A.7a)
(A.7b)
(A.7c)
It follows that Ys for s ∈ N defined in (A.7b) and (A.7c)
are mutually independent because of (2.1) and the indepen-
dence of the edge variables. Note that Z˜C = (UC ,Z
n
C) =
(UC ,X
n
EC
), where the first equality is by (2.2), and the second
equality is by (2.8). Hence, we can rewrite 1, as the sum∑
B⊆N µ(B)H(Y0|YB) in (A.4) with
µ(B) :=
{
1, B = C ∪ EC , C ∈ P
0, otherwise.
Then, (A.2b) in Proposition A.1 holds with the non-negative
weights defined as
w0 :=
∑
B⊆N
µ(B)
=
∑
C∈P
µ(C ∪ EC) = |P|,
wi :=
∑
B⊆N :i∈B
µ(B) for i ∈ V
=
∑
C∈P:i∈C
µ(C ∪ EC) = 1
we :=
∑
B⊆N :e∈B
µ(B) for e ∈ E
=
∑
C∈P:e∈EC
µ(C ∪ EC)
= |{C ∈ P | C ∩ ξ(e) 6= ∅}|.
(A.8a)
(A.8b)
(A.8c)
As an example, for the triangle PIN Z{1,2,3} defined in
(4.3) and illustrated in Fig. 3, and the partition P :=
{{1}, {2}, {3}} into singletons,
w0 = |P| = 3
w1 = w2 = w3 = 1
wa = wb = wc = 2,
as we in (A.8c) reduces to the number of incident nodes of
edge e for singleton partition.
It follows that
w0 = |P| ≥ we ≥ 1 = wi ∀e ∈ E, i ∈ V.
Enumerate E as {e1, . . . , e|E|} such that
we1 ≥ we2 ≥ · · · ≥ we|E| . (A.9)
Then, the desired ordering in Step 1 of the greedy algorithm
in Proposition A.1 satisfies
s1 = 0
{s2, . . . , s|E|+1} = {e1, . . . , e|E|}
{s|E|+2, . . . , s|E|+|V |+1} = V
(A.10a)
(A.10b)
(A.10c)
and so µ∗ defined in (A.3) can be evaluated as shown in
Fig. 5b, with possibly non-zero values at
S1 = {s1} = {0}
Sj+1 = {0} ∪ {ej′ | 1 ≤ j
′ ≤ j} for 1 ≤ j ≤ |E|
Sk = S = {0} ∪E ∪ V.
By (A.4) in Corollary A.1, we can lower bound 1, with∑
B⊆S µ
∗(B)H(Y0|YB\{0}), which simplifies to
1,≥
µ∗(S1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(|P| − we1 )H(
Y0|YS1\{0}︷︸︸︷
F,K)
+
|E|−1∑
j=1
µ∗(Sj+1)︷ ︸︸ ︷(
wej − wej+1
)
H(
Y0|YSj+1\{0}︷ ︸︸ ︷
F,K|Xn{ej′ |1≤j′≤j})
+
µ∗(S|E|+1)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(we|E| − 1)H(
Y0|YS|E|+1\{0}︷ ︸︸ ︷
F,K|XnE )
+H(
Y0|YS\{0}︷ ︸︸ ︷
F,K|XnE ,UV ).
(A.11)
Using the triangle PIN and singleton partition again as an
example, we have
µ∗({0}) = µ∗({0, a, b, c}) = µ∗({0, a, b, c, 1, 2, 3}) = 1
so that the above inequality evaluates to
H(F,K|Z˜1) +H(F,K|Z˜2) +H(F,K|Z˜3)
≥ H(F,K) +H(F,K|X{a,b,c}) +H(F,K|U{1,2,3},X{a,b,c}).
By the fact that entropy and µ∗ are non-negative set functions,
it follows that
1,≥ (|P| − we1 )H(F,K)
(f)
=(|P| − 1) [1− α(P)]H(F,K)
(g)
=(|P| − 1) [1− α(P)] [H(F) +H(K)− nδ′n]
for some δ′n → 0 as n→∞, where
• (f) is because by (A.9) and (A.8c),
we1 := max
e∈E
we = max
e∈E
|{C ∈ P | C ∩ ξ(e) 6= ∅}|
= (|P| − 1)α(P) + 1 by (4.1b).
|P| − we1 = (|P| − 1) [1− α(P)]
• (g) is by the secrecy constraint (2.5).
Applying the above inequality and (A.6) to (A.5) and simpli-
fying, we have
α(P)
H(F)
n
≥ [1− α(P)]
[
H(K)
n
− δ′n
]
−
δn
|P| − 1
,
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which implies (4.1) because
sup lim inf
n→∞
H(K)
n
≥ sup lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log|K| = CS(R)
by the secrecy constraint (2.5) and the definition of secrecy
capacity (2.6),
lim sup
n→∞
H(F)
n
≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log|F | ≤ R
by (2.7), and δn → 0, δ′n → 0 as n→∞. 
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF VP BOUND IN THEOREM 4.3
Consider any uV ∈ RV+ . By the recoverability con-
straint (2.4), we have
nδn ≥
∑
i∈V
uiH(K|F, Z˜i)
=
∑
i∈V
uiH(K,F|Z˜i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1,
−
∑
i∈V
uiH(F|Z˜i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2,
We will bound 1, and 2, as follows.
1,≥

∑
i∈V
ui −max
e∈E
∑
i∈V :i∈ξ(e)
ui

H(K,F)
=
[
u(V )−max
e∈E
u(ξ(e))
]
[H(K|F) +H(F)],
where the inequality is by applying Corollary A.1 and keeping
only the first term, i.e., µ∗(S1)H(Y0|YS1\{0}). Next, by the
fact that conditioning does not increase entropy,
2,≤
∑
i∈V
uiH(F) = u(V )H(F).
Now, with
ϕ(uV ) := max
e∈E
u(ξ(e))
u(V )
,
the bounds on 1, and 2, above give
[1− ϕ(uV )]
H(K|F)
n
≤ ϕ(uV )
H(F)
n
+
δn
u(V )
,
which gives the following bound on CS(R):
[1− ϕ(uV )]CS(R) ≤ ϕ(uV )R.
Finally, we will show that the VP bound follows from
the above bound by choosing the optimal uV that minimizes
ϕ(uV ) as follows:
min
uV ∈RV+
ϕ(uV ) = min
uV ∈RV+
max
e∈E
u(ξ(e))
u(V )
= min
uV ∈RV+ :u(ξ(e))≤1,∀e∈E
1
u(V )
=
1
τ
(B.1)
where the last equality is by (4.4b). This completes the
proof. As a comparison to the proof of the EP bound in
Appendix A, we did not invoke the inequality [30, Lemma B.1]
for interactive public discussion.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LAMINATION BOUND IN THEOREM 4.4
Similar to the previous proofs, by the recoverability con-
straint (2.4), we have
nδn ≥
∑
B
π(B)H(K|F, Z˜V \B)
=
∑
B
π(B)H(K,F|Z˜V \B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1,
−
∑
B
π(B)H(F|Z˜V \B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2,
Again, we will bound 1, and 2, separately as follows.
1,=
∑
B
π(B)H(K,F|UV \B,X
n
EV \B
)
≥

∑
B
π(B)−max
e∈E
∑
B:ξ(e)\B 6=∅
π(B)

H(K,F)
=

min
e∈E
∑
B:ξ(e)⊆B
π(B)


︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=β(π)
[H(K|F) +H(F)]
where the inequality follows by applying Corollary A.1 and
keeping only the first term, i.e., µ∗(S1)H(Y0|YS1\{0}). On
the other hand, by (4.6b),
2,=
∑
B
[π(B)−ρλ(B)]H(F|Z˜V \B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a)
≤H(F)
+ρ
∑
B
λ(B)H(F|Z˜V \B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b)
≤H(F)
≤
[∑
B
[π(B) − ρλ(B)] + ρ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=γ(λ,π,ρ)
H(F)
where (a) follows from the fact that conditioning can not
increase entropy; (b) follows from [30, Lemma B.1] for the
interactive discussion F and (4.6a). It follows that
β(π)
H(K|F)
n
≤ [γ(λ, π, ρ)− β(π)]
H(F)
n
+ δn
which gives the desired reuslt (4.5a) because δn → 0 as n→
∞,
sup lim inf
n→∞
H(K|F)
n
≥ sup lim inf
n→∞
1
n
log|K| = CS(R)
by the secrecy constraint (2.5) and the definition of secrecy
capacity (2.6), and
lim sup
n→∞
H(F)
n
≤ lim sup
n→∞
1
n
log|F | ≤ R
by (2.7).
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.1
We will show that the lamination bound reduces to the EP
and VP bounds by some particular choice of the parameters
ρ, λ, and π.
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For any P ∈ Π′(V ), let
ρ = 1, λ(B) = π(B) =
{
1
|P|−1 , (V \B) ∈ P
0, otherwise.
It follows that
γ(λ, π, ρ) = 1,
β(π)= min
e∈E
∑
B∈2V \{∅,V }:ξ(e)⊆B
π(B)
= min
e∈E

 ∑
B∈2V \{∅,V }
π(B) −
∑
B∈2V \{∅,V }:ξ(e)∩(V \B) 6=∅
π(B)


= min
e∈E
[
|P|
|P| − 1
−
|{C ∈ P | ξ(e) ∩ C 6= ∅}|
|P| − 1
]
= 1− α(P),
where the last equality follows by (4.1b). Then, (4.5a) in
Theorem 4.4 becomes
[1− α(P)]CS(R) ≤ α(P)R
which is precisely the EP bound (4.1).
Let u∗V be the optimal solution to (B.1). Then, set
ρ = 0, λ(B) = 0, ∀B ⊆ V,
and
π(B) =
{
u∗i , B = V \ {i}, i ∈ V
0, otherwise.
It follows that
γ(λ, π, ρ) =
∑
B∈2V \{∅,V }
π(B) =
∑
i∈V
u∗i = u
∗(V )
β(π) = min
e∈E
∑
B∈2V \{∅,V }:ξ(e)⊆B
π(B)
= min
e∈E
∑
i∈V :ξ(e)⊆(V \{i})
u∗i
= min
e∈E
∑
i∈V \ξ(e)
u∗i
= u∗(V )−max
e∈E
u∗(ξ(e))
Therefore,
β(µ)
γ(λ, π, ρ)
= 1−max
e∈E
u∗(ξ(e))
u∗(V )
= 1−
1
τ
where the last equality follows from the assumption that u∗V
is optimal solution to (B.1). Applying the above to (4.5a)
in Theorem 4.4 gives the VP bound (4.4).
APPENDIX E
ALTERNATIVE CONVERSE PROOF FOR EXAMPLE 4.5 VIA
ITERATIVE LAMINATION
Similar to the proof of the lamination bound, by the recov-
erability constraint (2.4),
nδn ≥ H(K|F, Z˜2) +H(K|F, Z˜3)
+ 2H(K|F, Z˜4) + 2H(K|F, Z˜5)
The r.h.s. can be written as 1,− 2, where
1, := H(K,F|Z˜2) +H(K,F|Z˜3)
+ 2H(K,F|Z˜4) + 2H(K,F|Z˜5)
2, := H(F|Z˜2) +H(F|Z˜3) + 2H(F|Z˜4) + 2H(F|Z˜5)
Again, we will bound 1, and 2, separate. We can bound 2,
easily as follows.
2,≤ H(F|Z˜2) +H(F|Z˜4) + 4H(F)
To bound 1,, we will apply the lamination procedure as before.
1,
(a)
=H(K,F|U2,X
n
{a,c,d}) +H(K,F|U3,X
n
{a,b})
+ 2H(K,F|U4,X
n
{b,c}) + 2H(K,F|U5,X
n
d)
(b)
≥(6− 3)H(K,F) + (3 − 2)H(K,F|Xn{b,c,d})
+ (2− 1)H(K,F|U{4,5},X
n
{a,b,c,d})
+H(K,F|U{2,3,4,5},X
n
{a,b,c,d})
(c)
≥ 3H(K,F) + (3− 2)H(K,F|Xn{b,c,d})
≥ 3H(K,F) +H(F|Xn{b,c,d})
where (a) follows from (2.2) and the source dependence
structure (4.7); (b) is obtained by applying Corollary A.1 with
the appropriate weights calculated in the following matrix;
(K,F) U2 U3 U4 U5 X
n
a X
n
b X
n
c X
n
d
H(K,F|U2,X
n
{a,c,d}) 1 1 1 1 1
H(K,F|U3,X
n
{a,b}) 1 1 1 1
2H(K,F|U4,X
n
{b,c}) 2 2 2 2
2H(K,F|U5,X
n
d ) 2 2 2
sum 6 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3
(c) follows again from Corollary A.1 with the appropriate
weights calculated in the following matrix;
(K, F) Xnb,c,d (U{4,5},X
n
a ) U{2,3}
H(K,F|Xn{b,c,d}) 1 1
H(K,F|U{4,5},X
n
{a,b,c,d}) 1 1 1
H(K,F|U{2,3,4,5},X
n
{a,b,c,d}) 1 1 1 1
sum 3 3 2 1
We call the above bounding technique iterative lamination be-
cause, unlike the proof of the lamination bound in Appendix C,
Corollary A.1 is applied iteratively.
Altogether, we have
1,− 2,≥ 3H(K,F) +H(F|Xn{b,c,d})
−
[
H(F|Z˜2) +H(F|Z˜4) + 4H(F)
]
= 3H(K,F)− 5H(F)
+H(F) +H(F|Xn{b,c,d})︸ ︷︷ ︸
3,
−
[
H(F|Z˜2) +H(F|Z˜4)
]
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We further bound 3, as follows:
3,
(a)
≥H(F|Z˜{2,5}) +H(F|Z˜{1,3,4}) +H(F|X
n
{b,c,d})
(b)
=H(F|U{2,5},X
n
{a,c,d})
+H(F|U{1,3,4},X
n
{a,b,c}) +H(F|X
n
{b,c,d})
(c)
≥H(F|U{2,5},X
n
{a,c,d})
+H(F|U{1,3,4},X
n
{a,b,c,d}) +H(F|X
n
{b,c})
(d)
≥H(F|U{1,2,3,4,5},X
n
{a,b,c,d})
+H(F|Xn{a,c,d}) +H(F|X
n
{b,c})
≥ H(F|Xn{a,c,d}) +H(F|X
n
{b,c})
≥ H(F|U2,X
n
{a,c,d}) +H(F|U4,X
n
{b,c})
(e)
=H(F|Z˜2) +H(F|Z˜4),
where (a) is because H(F) ≥ H(F|Z˜{2,5}) + H(F|Z˜{1,3,4})
by [30, Lemma B.1]; (b) and (e) follows from the defini-
tion (2.2) of Z˜i’s and the hypergraphical source (4.7); (c) is
obtained by applying Corollary A.1 to the last two terms; (d)
is obtained by applying Corollary A.1 to the first two terms.
Therefore,
1,− 2,≥ 3H(K,F)− 5H(F) = 3H(K|F)− 2H(F),
and so
3
H(K|F)
n
≤ 2
H(F)
n
+ δn,
which gives CS(R) ≤
2
3R as desired.
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